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Abstract 
For a preference function U(y), to be a proper representation of the 
community's well being, y should contain all relevant aspects of life 
and will therefore be of high dimension. In any analysis to support 
policy proposals this high dimensionality needs to be reduced to an 
operational setting. A policy problem is therefore studied in a pro-
jection of U(y) into some explicitly defined variables. In this paper 
it is shown how preference functions can be based upon interviews of 
political parties. This helps to highlight consequences often ignored. 
1989/169/M3 

CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
2. PREFERENCES AND POSSIBILITIES 
2.1 The specification of the preference function and the sources 
of information collected 
2.2 How real are the scenarios 
3. THE INQUIRY; DESIGN AND RESULTS 
3.1 The enquirees 
3.2 Policy variables; set A 
3.3 Policy variables; set B 
4. THE ESTIMATED FUNCTIONS 
4.1 The variables of set A and set B 
4.2 Sensivity 
4.3 Stability through time 
5. THE IMPLICATIONS 
5.1 Preliminaries 
5.2 The Phillips curve 
6. SUMMARY 

- 1 -
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many economie problems require the maximization of some preference 
function, given a model which describes definitions, technical con-
straints and reaction patterns of economie agents. Most studies 
concentrate on the improvement of the models, however, interest in 
preference functions is increasing. 
For U(y) to be a proper representation of the community's well being, 
y should contain all relevant aspects of life and will therefore be of 
high dimension. Without a projection of such a preference function 
into a small number of crucial variables an operational model would 
not be possible. Most researchers are not aware that such a projection 
should affect our analysis and our a priori ideas on functions and 
parameters. We will show this by constructing preference functions 
from direct interviewing policy makers. The construction of these 
empirical preference functions follows earlier work in this field, 
e.g. Merkies and Nijman (1981, 1983), Van Daal and Merkies (1984) and 
Merkies and Hofkes (1986). The present paper draws heavily on the 
latter. The book by Van Daal and Merkies also gives references to the 
work with Vermaat, where particularities about data collection and 
intricacies involved are described. The basic assumption is that 
macro-economie preferences can be approximated by a quadratic function 
around the prevailing value of the arguments. 
The direct interviewing refers to evaluations for various conceivable 
values of the arguments. Additional Information is provided by the 
answers to questions about the optimal conditions as viewed by the 
interviewed. The mathematical framework, more extensively described in 
Merkies and Hofkes (1986) is sketched in section 2. The data, 
collected at the end of 1983, are described for the present purpose in 
section 3. The resulting preference functions for five Dutch political 
parties are described in section 4. This section also gives 
information on the sensivity of these functions with respect to some 
of the underlying assumptions. The implications of our findings are 
illustrated by the implied Phillips curve in section 5. Finally, 
section 6 summarizes. 
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2. PREFERENGES AND POSSIBILITIES 
2.1 The specification of the preference ftmction and the sources of 
information collected 
A macro-economie policy problem can be formalized as: 
max W(y,x) 
(2.1) 
s.t. G(y,x,z) - 0 
where y, x and z are vectors of targets, Instruments (controls) and 
data respectively. The projection of W(y,x) in targets alone is 
written as U(y) and can be approximated by 
U(y) «= aQ + a'y + hy'Ay (2.2) 
where the constant a0 , the row vector a' with n linear parameters at 
and A, the positive definite matrix of quadratic parameters ati , may 
depend upon the prevailing situation y*. 
To estimate the parameters of (2.2) we need observations. We have for 
each policymaker two sources of information. Our first source consists 
of N different (n+l)-tuples (ülj,yli yni) containing for each 
i=l,...,N an imaginary policy program (yXi,...,ynl) and the evaluation 
Uij of policymaker j of this program. The actual programs chosen and 
enquirees approached will be described in section 3 below. With the 
given information a regression equation for any j appears of the form 
U - Y0 + c (2.3) 
where U is a vector of N indices, Y is an Nx(K+l) matrix with typical 
row [yil ,yi2 y i n , y 2 L 1 yfn .y^y^ yiCn-nYin 1 containing 
the policy programs, fi is a columnvector of K+l parameters and e is an 
N-vector of errors, indicating improper introspection of the evalua-
tion. To save notation we dropped the index j, attached to U and 0. 
Introduction of a matrix A without any restriction would imply too 
many parameters, viz. K=(n2+3n)/2 ((n2+n)/2 quadratic parameters a±J 
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and n linear ones aL). In view of the reluctance of the enquirees to 
answer questionnaires with much more than 25 programs the estimation 
is not possible unless restrictions are introduced. Therefore the 
matrix A is restricted to be diagonal. Hence K is taken as 2n. The 
vector P is estimated as 
0 _ [Y'V^Y]"1 Y'V-iU. (2.4) 
The variance-covariance matrix of e is specified as 
CT2V _ a 2 d i a g ( p i 2 p - 2 ) ( 2 . 5 ) 
with pA a weight indicating the carefulness with which policy program 
y± is evaluated. The diagonality of the matrix V reflects the plau-
sible assumption that each policy program is evaluated independently. 
The weights express the idea that if a program is considered "odd" or 
its probability pt to occur low no serious attempt is made to quantify 
U± , leading to a large variance of e± . This approach arose from the 
refusal of some enquirees to answer on "odd" programs. Weights •pi are 
assumed to decrease with the distance of yi from the prevailing 
situation y£ . This assumption on V will be discussed in more detail 
in section 2.2. 
A second source of information is obtained as follows. The optimal 
value of U(y) is attained at 
^ - = - a - A y = 0. (2.6) 
The solution to this equation is indicated by y. Asking the enquirees 
to indicate the optimal value of their targets provides the value y°. 
The difference 
S = y - y° (2.7) 
substituted into (2.6) gives: 
a + Ay° + v - 0 (2.8) 
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with v-A5 a vector of length n. Equation (2.8) rewritten in observa-
tional form 
Rp + v « 0 (2.9) 
is added as a restriction to (2.3). Note that R is an nx(2n+l)-matrix 
so that (2.9) puts a constraint on the parameters for each of the n 
optimal values yf . The estimation problem can be solved by combining 
(2.3) and (2.9) into 
and assuming for the errors zero expectation and a variance-covariance 
matrix given by 
cov [:]-[".'-%.] 
where A is an indicator that relates the two sources of information. 
The parameters are estimated by 
Px - [Y' V-iY + (l/A)R'Vó1R]-1 Y' V_1U if A*0 (2.12) 
and by 
Px - 0 - Y'V-1YR' [R'Y'V^YR]"1 R^ if A-O (2.13) 
with p the estimator from (2.4). 
A A A 
The components of px rearranged as a and A give the estimated opti-
A A A 
mum as y = —A_1a (see (2.6)), which for AsO clearly differs from both 
the "true" optimum y and the revealed optimum y°. 
The value of A is of special interest. If only information on the 
evaluation of the programs is collected, y° does not exist and we may 
A _ 
take A-K» in which case (2.12) reduces to (2.4) and therefore PX~*P-
Such information is shown to be insufficiënt to generate adequate pre-
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ference functions, as it is not considered seriously enough by the 
enquirees. On the other hand, if political parties are only willing 
and able to provide their values of y° (strategies of revelation 
ignored) the measurement of a preference function is not possible. 
Therefore, it is useful to persuade parties to provide also the first 
source of information. We may proceed by choosing A=0 to avoid that 
the measurement of the preference function affects the implied value 
of the optimum 5-=0, but a value of X from the open interval (O,») is 
usually more proper. The element still to be explained is the 
variance-covariance matrix V0, indicating the precision with which the 
optimal values are provided. We assume: 
V0 - diag{af al) (2.14) 
with er? the variance of the variable yj over the past, expressing the 
idea that the more volatile a variable y^  has been in the past, the 
more difficult it will be to specify its optimal value y?. 
In the analysis given above it is tacitly assumed that the global pre-
ference function W(y,x) is differentiable in y* . This allowed us to 
work with symmetrie approximation (2.2). Differentiability in the 
entire domain of y was assumed to obtain (2.6). In view of this 
asymmetrie preference functions fall outside the scope of this paper. 
2.2 How real are the scenarios 
Before we ask an enquiree to evaluate a policy program i, we attach a 
weight Pi to it indicating its probability to occur. If such probabi-
lities are too low the enquirees are not willing to answer. The proba-
bilities are derived from a forecasting model, described in more 
detail in Merkies and Nijman (1981, 1983), and specified as: 
yt = 8 + t7 + t2a + r)t (2.15) 
yt is a vector of length n at time t; S, 7 and a are vectors of para-
meters of length n and rjt = IN(0,S) is a stochastic vector of length 
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n, which is independent of time. 
If we have a sample of length T, a simultaneous forecasting interval 
for some r years ahead can be constructed according to 
T-r-n+1 *-l _ . „, ,. ,„ ... 
(T_r)n
 e; 0 e T " Fa(n,T-r-n+l) (2.16) 
eT is a vector with n forecasting errors in year r with variance-cova-
riance matrix 
O - (M+qT)S (2.17) 
where S is the estimate of E and qT=X; (X'X)" XXT with X; = [l,r]. The 
parameter n which we will generally refer to as "the degree of uncer-
tainty of the future" is the ratio of the variance of the future to 
that in the past. For given a, probability-contours can be constructed 
from (2.16). Inversely, each scenario yi can be considered as a reali-
zation in year t+r, so that its forecasting error — lts difference 
with the forecast from (2.15) — can be computed and its a%-probability 
of excess — indicated by pt — can be derived from (2.16). 
Apart from these probabilities pt we also ask the enquirees themselves 
to evaluate the realism of a policy program. This can be done only 
after a set of programs is specified. The computation of probabilities 
p± helps to select a proper set of policy programs in advance. The 
diagonal elements of the matris S help to specify the matrix V0 in 
(2.11) if we assume that the accuracy with which the optima J are 
evaluated is related to the variance of the variables in the past. 
3. THE INQUIRY; DESIGN AND RESULTS 
3.1 The enquirees 
We held an inquiry among political parties, more specifically among 
their representations in the "Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal" (Par-
liament). Those who provided answers that could be processed are men-
tioned in table 1 together with the number of seats they held in that 
chamber. 
- 7 -
Table 1. The political partjes inquired* 
Number of 
CDA Christian Democrats 45 
W D Liberals 36 
PvdA Labour Party 47 
D'66 Democrats 6 
GPV Reformed Political Association 1 
Total number of seats in participating parties 135 
Total number of seats in Lower Chamber 150 
* A coalition of CDA and W D as in power during this period. 
The questions concerned a set of 25 "policy programs" (N=25). Each 
program refers only to the values of five policy variables (n=5). A 
set provides two sources of information; first the evaluation U^ of 
party j on each of the 25 programs and secondly the content of the 
optimal program of party j. We collected information on two different 
sets of policy programs, A and B. 
3.2 Policy variables; set A 
The policy variables of set A are: 
yx = registered unemployment of the dependent working population 
according to the definition introduced in CEP 1983 
y2 = growthrate of real NNP 
y3 - percentage increase in the price-index of wage-earners' 
family expenditure 
y4 = borrowing requirements of the Government (as a percentage of 
NNP) 
y5 — balance of payments of current account (as a percentage of 
NNP). 
The 25 possible scenarios for 1987 of these variables are given in 
tabel 2a. The information asked for is indicated by dots. The first 
source of information concerns the evaluations of the programs in the 
column indicated by U, the second source is the specification of the 
optimal program in the first row. Hence this row (»= y°) differed among 
the parties. 
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Table 2a. Scenarios for 1987: set A 
U y i y2 Y3 y« y5 a) 
1 100 
2 16 -1 7 13 2 100 
3 12 2 8 9 2 78 
4 16 2 7 14 2 99 
5 16 -5 7 14 2 100 
6 16 -2 9 14 2 100 
7 16 -2 4 14 2 100 
8 16 -2 7 14 -1 95 
9 16 -2 7 14 5 94 
10 12 -2 7 14 2 62 
11 18 -2 7 14 2 98 
12 16 -2 7 9 2 66 
13 16 -2 7 17 2 82 
14 14 -2 7 9 2 81 
15 16 -2 8 9 2 64 
16 12 1 5 8 2 61 
17 18 -3 7 9 3 44 
18 17 0 4 9 4 70 
19 20 1 3 10 5 58 
20 16 2 3 13 4 94 
21 16 3 3 10 4 87 
22 16 2 2 10 4 84 
23 16 2 3 10 0 77 
24 10 2 3 10 4 16 
25 16 2 3 7 4 42 
}
 Probability of occurrence, see text. 
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Scenario number 18 represented more of less*5 the actual situation pre-
vailing at the time of the inquiry (fall of 1983), hence y18 = y*. 
The last column of table 2a refers to the probabilities pA as describ-
ed in section 2.2. To compute these probabilities we disposed of a 
sample of time series covering the period 1964-1983, so T=20 (years). 
In applying (2.15) we selected a quadratic trend for two variables 
only (i-1 and i—4). Hence for three out of five variables a regression 
with a linear trend was run for the period 1964 until and inclusive 
1983; for the variables yx and y4 a quadratic term of a^t2 was added. 
To compute (2.16) we specified T=20, n=5 and r=3 (so ignoring that no 
quadratic term is included in 3 equations). 
The parameters of (2.17) selected for the present study are 
fi - 10 (degree of uncertainty of the future) 
(3.1) 
r — 1 (horizon of the enquiree) 
The first value was found in the previous studies to be a reasonable 
compromise. It expresses the view that the degree of uncertainty of 
the future is ten times as great as suggested by the variance of our 
regression. The parameter r, which we will refer to as the "horizon of 
the enquiree", is given a value of one to indicate that the enquirees 
considered these scenarios implicitly as to refer to 1985 (1 year 
ahead from the time of the inquiry). In other words the horizon of the 
evaluators was taken to be one year and not 3 years as suggested by 
the inquiry (see table 2a). The probabilities pA were calculated, ac-
cording to these rules, prior to the inquiry. Thus we could compile a 
set of scenarios of different degree of attainability. For instance, 
program 24 was thought to be so unrealistic that its probability to 
appear (or rather the probability that this program or a more odd vec-
tor in the same Cartesian direction would materialize in 1985) was 
thought to be only 16% and it seemed almost certain that situation 2, 
5, 6 or 7 would arise, indicating that an inflation of 9% (alt 6) was 
*) The measurement of the "actual" situation is not unambiguous. It depends upon the time of 
measurement. It remains always possible that more recent Information gives corrections on 
earlier estimates. Moreover, measurement errors always remain. 
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considered as equally likely as an inflation of 4% (alt 7) and more or 
less the same view existed with respect to a decreased growth of 1% 
(alt 2) or of 5% (alt 5). 
There are some points worth noting concerning these probabilities: 
1. The probabilities of table 2a are calculated with (2.16) and 
therefore of a mechanical character. They were needed prior to the 
inquiry to assure sufficiënt variety in the set of scenarios. 
2. Parties' views on the reality of the scenarios were also asked 
for. They were quite different, see table 3. Only the Democrats' 
views were positively correlated (r=.20) with the mechanically 
obtained probabilities. 
3. Ex post comparison between the mechanical and the parties' views 
revealed that changing the "degree of uncertainty of the future" p 
or the "horizon" r would not have improved the correlation, see 
table 3. 
4. It is of interest to see how the parties looked upon the reality 
of their own preferred plans, see table 4. 
5. Ex post the real situations for both 1984 until 1987 can be added 
for comparison. We have: 
yj ii za y* i s . 
1984 17 2 3 9 5 
1985 16 2 3 7 5 
1986 15 3 0 6 3 
1987 14 1 0 8 2 
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Table 3. Correlation between partjes' and mechanlcal views on 
scenarios: set A 
j Parties' estimates computed estimates 
CDA W D PvdA D'66 
r-1 | r-2 
A«= =10 /i«15 | /*=10 p-15 
CDA 1.00 0.80 0.68 0.33 -0.46 -0.40 -0.61 -0.57 
W D 0.80 1.00 0.78 0.13 -0.54 -0.52 -0.62 -0.63 
PvdA 0.68 0.78 1.00 0.00 -0.36 -0.31 -0.41 -0.38 
D'66 0.33 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.25 -0.07 0.02 
Table 4. Preferences of political parties and the chances to realize 
them: set A 
Programs y° Probabilities 
parties M-10 M=15 
Yi y2 y3 v4 y5 own r« 1 r= 1 
CDA 12.0 3.0 3.0 7.0 2.75 0.90 0.41 0.60 
W D 5.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 0.00 0.02 0.06 
PvdA 14.0 3.0 4.0 9.0 3.0 0.25 0.78 0.88 
D'66 4.0 5.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 0.00 0.02 0.06 
GPV 10.0 3.0 10.0 6.5 3.0 1) 0.14 0.29 
1) No information given. 
3.3 Policy variables; set B 
The variables of the second set are: 
y1 — registered unemployment of the dependent working population 
according to the definition introduced in CEP 1983. 
y3 = percentage increase in the price-index of wage-earner's 
family expenditure. 
y6 - Public share in net national income. 
y7 = Labour share in net national income. 
y8 - (competitiveness) difference in percentage increase in real 
unit labour costs (in guilders) between the Netherlands and 
its competitors. 
The scenarios of set B were designed similarly to those in table 2a. 
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No one was near to the realized view on 1985. Probabilities were com-
puted as before, a quadratic term was selected only for variable yx. 
Again we specified T=20, n=5 and r-=3 (ignoring zero parameters of 
quadratic terms) . Again we choose fi-10 and r—l. 
Table 5. Correlation between parties' and mechanical views on scenarios: 
set B 
Parties'estimates Computed estimates 
CDA W D PvdA D'66 
r-l r-2 
(i-10 fi-15 (i=10 (i=15 
CDA 
W D 
PvdA 
D'66 
1.00 0.15 0.21 0.15 
0.15 1.00 0.83 -0.36 
0.21 0.83 1.00 -0.13 
0.15 -0.36 -0.13 1.00 
-0.46 -0.48 -0.53 -0.59 
-0.39 -0.34 -0.53 -0.52 
-0.37 -0.35 -0.47 -0.47 
0.51 0.49 0.42 0.43 
Table 5 again shows mainly negative correlations between the mechanic-
al probabilities and those the parties attached to the different pro-
grams. 
The optimal vectors of the parties and their probabilities are given 
in table 6. 
Table 6. Preferences of political parties and the chances to 
realize them: set B 
programs y° probabilities 
y i y 3 ye y? y 8 
parties (i=10 fi=15 
own r—l r—l 
CDA 
W D 
PvdA 
D'66 
GPV 
12 3 57 85 2 
5 3 50 80 0 
14 4 57 84 2 
4 2 58 85 -1 
10 0 56 85 2 
0.90 0.25 0.44 
0.00 0.00 0.01 
0.25 0.19 0.37 
0.00 0.09 0.21 
i) 0.15 0.30 
i) No information given. 
- 13 -
4. THE ESTIMATED FUNCTIONS 
4.1. The variables of set A and set B 
Preference functions can be estimated if one is willing to accept 
parties' evaluations of our programs as sensible information. As soon 
as some positive value is attached to A preference functions can be 
better estimated but the optimal y° from tables 4 (and 6) is affected. 
This will be replaced by estimate y°. The choice of A is a subjective 
matter as indicated above, but there are some objective elements 
involved. If A gradually increases from zero to larger positive values 
it may happen that the estimation procedure fails to generate a 
negative semi-definite Hessian matrix A. Then at least for one 
variable the vector y° does not indicate maximum utility! This 
clearly sets a limit value to A. In Merkies and Hofkes (1986) 
extensive results for various A are shown. Here we give only results 
for A-O.001 and parties own weights (see tables 7 and 8). 
Table 7. Estimates of preference functions with parties' own weights: 
set A 
p a r t y a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 ' \alx haZ2 4a 3 3 ha^ ha 5 5 
CDA -11.14 -19.93 0.11 -4 .55 -8 .10 -3 .25 -1.99 -0 .01 -2 .26 -2.02 -1.29 
WD 1.66 -2 .43 4.98 -1 .94 -10.28 1.22 -0 .10 -1 .00 -0 .97 -0 .79 0.30 
PvdA 20.84 -4 .90 8.84 0.03 0.03 -7 .90 -0 .80 -1 .47 -1.29 -5 .84 -3 .94 
D'66 -6 .83 -10.68 2.04 0.40 -0 .97 -1 .85 -0 .41 -0 .20 0.10 -0 .08 -0 .31 
Computed optima y t y2 y3 y4 y5 U 
CDA 
WD 
PvdA 
D'66 
12.0 10.70 2.99 7.00 2.74 91 
5.01 2.50 3.00 2.50 1.99 86 
13.95 3.01 4 .01 9.00 3.00 46 
3.98 4.98 1.95 2.97 1.00 73 
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Table 8. Estimates of preference functions with partjes' own weights: 
set B 
party a0 a1 a3 a6 a7 a 8 ^ an **a3 3 ^ 6 6 Ha77 ^ a 8 8 
\ -5.71 18.62 -0.39 0.19 -0.41 -0.95 -3.10 
1 -7.26 2.75 -0.07 0.97 -0.10 -0.45 -1.38 
-0.0 -8.57 -28.21 5.00 -1.25 -0.0 1.43 
^ 0.03 -0.00 -0.08 0.02 -0.36 0.01 0.04 
11.98 3.00 56.88 85.00 2.0 99.7 
5.00 3.00 50.00 80.00 -0.0 106.7 
14.00 4.00 57.0 84.00 2.0 100 
4.01 1.98 57.98 84.84 -1.0 11.98 
CDA 10.05 -3.15 -0.00 -1.72
W D -0.04 -1.52 -0.00 -1.76 
PvdA 0.0 -112.86 -10.0 -5.0 
D'66 -0.03 -1.95 0.04 -0.74 
Computed optima y1 y3 y6 y7 y8 U 
CDA 
W D 
PvdA 
D'66 
4.2 Sensivity 
The most striking feature of the result is that the computed optima y 
hardly differ from the revealed optima y0 in tables 4 and 6. This is 
not surprising as parties' own weights are in general rather close to 
zero, which implies that such observations are more or less ignored in 
the computations. With so many weights close to zero the informational 
content of the first source shrinks away leaving the conclusions to 
depend only on Information of source 2. This is also indicated by the 
U-values of the various optima which are much closer to 100 than those 
with mechanical weights. It is not surprising that the measured prefe-
rence functions become rather unreliable as they depend only upon a 
very mutilated set of observations. The slight differences between 
computed and revealed optima must be handled with prudence. We have 
verified whether our conclusions were depending upon the weights. 
Table 9 gives for the variables of set A for each party and for each 
variable whether the computed optimum was above (+) or below (-) the 
revealed optimum if the mechanical weights were used. If the same 
feature was found with parties' own probabilities an asterisk (*) is 
attached to the indicated sign. 
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Table 9. Estimated optima higher (+) or lower (-) than revealed 
optima; 
set A; modelweights (* does not change if parties' 
weights are used) 
yi yz ys y« ys 
unemployment growth inflation govt. balance of 
finance payments 
CDA 
W D 
PvdA 
D'66 
GPV 
The hidden wish for higher growth rates and lower unemployment appears 
to be independent of the set of weights. 
For the second set of variables sufficiënt information is lacking to 
construct a table. 
4.3 Stability through time 
whether preferences are stable through time can be verified with the 
help of the variables of set B. In Merkies and Nijman (1983) 
preference functions on the same set of variables are discussed. They 
referred to 1977, the same procedure was foliowed and optima were 
computed in the same way. The results are reported in Merkies and 
Hofkes (1986) The remarkable point is that much lower unemployment 
figures were strived for in 1977. A saying often heard is: "Politics 
is the art to attain what is possible". The differences between 
computed and revealed optima vanish against differences over time. But 
this mainly concerns unemployment. Actual possibilities in the economy 
seem to be more important than preferences. 
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5. THE IMPLICATIONS 
5.1 Preiiminarie s 
We now turn to the implications of our computations. In our operation-
al setting the multidimensionality of the preference function is re-
duced to only five dimensions. As it remains a difficult task to fancy 
the shape of a preference function even in five dimensions, we simpli-
fy further by looking to the projection in two variables only: the 
price-index and the rate of unemployment. To be impartial we aggre-
gated the functions of the political parties into preferences of the 
community. It is common knowledge that the construction of such a com-
munity preference function is not possible in general, but it seems 
admissable for the restricted domain of the variables with which we 
are dealing here. The construction of such a function has the advan-
tage that we can study the implications of preferences on economie 
developments. In reality power play among political parties decides 
over the preferences that are favoured in a particular period. But as 
long as preferences are not too different, one may expect that a 
weighted average — with weights reflecting Parliament representation -
constitutes a reliable indication of the community's preferences. On 
these premises we have constructed the preference function of the 
Dutch community with respect to the two sets of variables discussed. 
The two functions are: 
U - -4.25
 7l - 0.45 y3 - 0.48 yf - 0.37 yf (5.1) 
U = -2.0
 yi - 0.01 y3 - 0.23 yf - 0.10 y§ (5.2) 
These two community preference functions can be handled in the same 
way as before. The optimal values for the two sets are: 
Table 10 
set A set B 
unemployment 12.57 11.65 
inflation 3.39 2.95 
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The indifference curves of the two quadratic preference functions are 
ellipsoids. Their projections for U-95 and U-99 (or 95% resp. 99% of 
the optimal value) are drawn in figure 1 (for set A) and figure 2 (for 
set B). The optimal points of table 10 are represented in the figures 
by a +sign and indicated by A. 
Comparison of both figures shows that the projection depends upon the 
variables in the preference function that are suppressed. In both 
figures the symmetry axes of the ellipses are parallel to the main 
axes of the diagram. This is not coincidental but follows from the 
diagonality of the matrix A in (2.2). This was assumed to save degrees 
of f reedom. Figure 1 and figure 2 suggest that it may not have been 
the most plausible assumption. 
Apart from the indifference curves we have represented the possibili-
ties in the figures. The point estimate of 1984, made with model 
(2.15) i.e. 14% unemployment and 6,5% inflation, is represented in 
both figures with a black box and indicated by B. We computed a 95% 
probability interval around this point in the way we also computed our 
probabilities in section 3. These intervals are ellipsoids in five 
dimensions. The projection is represented in the figures 1 and 2. As 
the variables suppressed in both preference functions are not the same 
the ellipses of the figures 1 and 2 differ. They are projections from 
two different f ive dimensional spaces. Note that these projections 
depend upon the values adopted for the suppressed variables. 
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Figure 1 Preferences and possibilities; set A 
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Figure 2 Preferences and possibilities: set B 
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If the weighted preference functions (5.1) and (5.2) reflect indeed 
the preferences of the collectivity and the possibility-ellipses are 
indeed true representations of what the economy allows, an optimal 
policy in the line of Theil (1968) can be constructed. The solution of 
the maximization of the preference function (5.1) and (5.2) subject to 
the quadratic constraints described by our ellipses leves one degree 
of freedom: the relation between ends and means. For given means the 
possibility-ellips is fixed and the optimal policy is obtained by 
varying the indifference ellips such that the two ellipses are 
tangent. The same solution can be obtained with a given indifference 
curve and a varying possibilities' ellips. The smaller we take this 
given indifference curve, the closer the optimal point will be to the 
community's optimum of table 10. It is clear that for different given 
indifference curves the optimal points will be on a curve that goes 
through both points A and B. A little geometry will indicate that 
this curve is only a straight line if both ellipses degenerate into 
circles. But although in general a variety of curves can appear, a 
glance at the figures shows that in our example the path between A and 
B is not far from a straight line. 
5.2 The Phillips curve 
We have selected the two variables inflation and unemployment to show 
some light on the significance of the Phillips-curve. Although the 
original form launched by Phillips (1958) connected money-wages with 
unemployment, the literature on this subject, see e.g. Desai (1984) 
often selects other representations of the concepts discussed. What-
ever the actual choice of the variables, the underlying significance 
remains somewhat obscure. Few authors attempt to describe the true 
nature of the relation. Does it describe demand or does it describe 
supply? Is it the locus of clearing points of the labour market or is 
it the result of a disequilibrium solution? Whatever the true nature, 
we would like to know what the scatter diagram originally studied by 
Phillips reflects. Is it allowed as for instance done by Reuber (1964) 
to interpret the graph through the scatter by the community's indif-
ference curve? To clarify the point we assume that usually the optimal 
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policy as given by Theil is more or less attained. This assumption is 
not as bold as it seems. Authors who try to deduce community's prefe-
rences front revealed preference theory, see e.g. Friedlander (1973) 
do in fact the same. 
In our framework the assumption would imply that, if neither preferen-
ces nor the economies' possibilities change the scatter of historical 
points would lie around the line-segment through A and B. The scatter 
of actual points in figure 1 and figure 2 shows that this is not the 
case. The points may be on a remote contour around A but they cannot 
be on a line-segment through A and B unless these points are also 
shifted. 
We have no definite answers yet on the questions raised above. There 
are, however, various features that are worth to draw attention to: 
1) Any curve through the scatter is a projection of a locus in higher 
dimensions. What differences this may cause is shown by the diffe-
rent positions of the possibilities curves in figure 1 and figure 
2. The same may hold f or the indif f erence curves if we allowed 
these to adopt skew positions (allowing non-zero off-diagonal ele-
ments in the Hessian matrix A). 
2) The community's optimum at the time of the inquiry was completely 
different from what it had been before, when such high unemploy-
ment rates as observed lately were considered unacceptable. The 
figures suggest that preferences are rather influenced by short 
term opportunities of the economy! 
3) The locus drawn through the historical scatter cannot be inter-
preted as an indifference curve. The indifference curve is neither 
a kind of hyperbola indicating higher utility the closer it is to 
the origin. The indifference curve is a rather unstable ellips 
around a point determined by the possibilities of the economy. 
4) The historical scatter may be interpreted as an upward sloping 
curve representing the A-B graph of optimal points. If this inter-
pretation is correct the fluctuation between ends and means decid-
ed over the actual situation between 1964 and 1983. 
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6. SUMMARY 
In this paper we have made another attempt to measure preferences of 
Dutch political parties on economie issues. For this purpose an in-
quiry was held at the end of 1983. The answers were analyzed within 
the framework of a collective choice model. Parties were inquired 
about two sets of variables; the first referred to unemployment, 
growth, inflation, government financing and the balance of payments. 
The second to unemployment, inflation, distribution between public and 
private, distribution between labour and other income and finally 
international competitiveness. Parties were asked to indicate their 
target values on these variables for the period 1983-1987 and also to 
evaluate various alternative economie situations. 
The information on the first set allowed us to measure quadratic 
preference functions for four political parties (Christian Democrats, 
Liberals, Socialists and Reformed Political Association). The same 
holds for the second set but for the Socialists. The answers of the 
fifth party — the Democrats — did not generate functions for either 
set. 
This result as such indicates that it is at least formally possible to 
measure preference functions by inquiries. It appeared that evaluation 
of altematives provides useful additional information on the indicat-
ed targets if parties confess consistent long term options. This was 
most clearly shown by the answers of the Liberals and somewhat less by 
the Reformed Political Association. Nevertheless the dominating result 
was that revealed targets in general heavily depend upon the actual 
state and possibilities of the economy. One may call this realism, 
modesty or myopia according to one's attitude. It may also indicate a 
weakness of the inquiry to clarify the difference between a long term 
goal and a partial achievement within a given time period. 
With the computed preference functions alternative target values were 
generated. Comparison with values that were revealed is compiled in 
table 9. This shows that in general parties preferred higher growth 
rates, lower unemployment and more stringent borrowing requirements 
for the government than they were willing to admit. 
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Comparison of our results with earlier attempts supports the view men-
tioned above that preferences shift with actual opportunities of the 
economy. If this is true it affects the interpretation of certain re-
lations in economie theory e.g. the Phillips-curve. The empirical 
relation between price increases and unemployment ratios can no longer 
be interpreted as an indifference-curve as e.g. done by Reuber (1964). 
The relation may indicate the opportunities of the economy, but our 
sample period (1964-1983) is probably too short to verify such a 
statement. 
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